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CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
REGIME STABILITY 
PROLOGUE 
“Beware the person with a Buddha’s mouth and a 
snake’s heart” 
CHINESE PROVERB 
 
I. INTERNATIONAL MATTERS: CHINA, THE UN AND AUSTRALIA 
Dr Michael Fullilove argued in December 2010 that China 
has become a far more active and effective contributor 
to the United Nations. He emphasized, however, that 
increased engagement with the UN has its limits. China, 
in spite of its increased UN activity, has thus far 
refused to shoulder all of the responsibilities attached 
to its newly-gained great power status. At one end of 
what Fullilove calls a UN ‘stakeholder spectrum’, 
China has enhanced its contribution to UN peacekeeping. 
At the other end of the ‘spectrum’, China has refused 
to engage over human rights issues and has used its 
Security Council veto to shield pariah states from 
international pressure. Fullilove warns that China’s 
intensification of its engagement in the UN and its 
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assumption of a more active role may not be compliant 
with Western expectations.
1
 
 
China’s seat on the United Nations Security Council was 
originally held (from 1949 to 1971) by Chiang Kai-
Shek’s Nationalist Government, known as the ‘Republic 
of China.’ However, the Nationalists were forced to 
retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, during the 
Chinese Civil War. A 
Communist Government was 
left in control of 
mainland China, henceforth 
known as the ‘People’s 
Republic of China.’In 
1971, Resolution 2758 
recognized the PRC as the 
rightful representative of 
China in the UN and gave 
it the seat on the 
Security Council that had 
been held by the Republic of China, which was expelled 
from the UN altogether. Both Governments still claim one 
another’s territory, although only a few small nations 
continue to officially recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty. 
                                                          
1
 Dr Michael Fullilove is a former Rhodes Scholar and Advisor to Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and is 
currently Director of the Global Issues Programme at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and is a 
Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. 
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China has become a highly engaged actor in the UN 
Security Council, which itself has taken a much more 
active role in collective security since the end of the 
Cold War. China’s positions in Council deliberations 
are pragmatic and instrumental, not primarily 
ideological. It is especially motivated by two 
calculations: strategic interest and political 
reputation vis-a-vis the international community. 
2
 
China’s path to engagement has extended over a lengthy 
period of some 41 years, stemming initially from its 
admission in 1971 in place of the defeated Nationalists. 
There are three identifiable ‘phases’: first that 
between 1971 and 1982 (where China was a passive 
learner, making frequent abstentions on peacekeeping 
votes and aligning itself with the Third World); second 
that between 1982 and 1992 (where China began to 
increase its engagement by taking the initiative); and 
third 1992 to the present (where China has adopted 
active engagement, has approved of most resolutions and 
participated in some PKOs). 
China’s strategic rationale has been, and in some 
cases, continues to be, to use its seat on the Security 
Council as a vehicle to check United States’ 
unilateralism in international affairs. China’s 
rationale is also to attempt to build up a credible 
                                                          
2
 See Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Participation In The UN Security Council”, Powerpoint Presentation, Hong Kong 
Political Science Association, 21 August 2009. 
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image of a ‘responsible great power’ that accepts pre-
existing institutions and norms. 
Since the Security Council’s inception up until August 
2011, China (ROC/PRC) has used its veto six times; 
France 18 times; 
Russia/USSR 122 times; the United Kingdom 32 times; and 
the United States 81 times.
3
 
 
The following Table illustrates how five of China’s 
Security Council vetoes came about: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 See Professor C. L. Sanders, “History Of The United Nations Security Council”, 30 August 2011, as at URL 
<smileyandwest.ning.com/22profiles/blogs/history-of-the-united-nations-security-council> Accessed 8 August 
2012. 
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TABLE OF CHINA’S VETOES 
IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
JANUARY 1997 TO FEBRUARY 2012 
 
DATE ISSUE EFFECT REASON 
10 January 1997 Guatemala peace 
keeping mission 
Prevent military 
observer mission 
Guatemala’s long-
standing diplomatic 
recognition of 
Taiwan 
25 February 1999 Macedonia 
peace keeping force 
Discontinue UNPREDEP 
mission 
Macedonian adoption 
of diplomatic 
relations with 
Taiwan 
12 January 2007 Myanmar: censure 
over human rights 
abuses 
 
Failure to condemn 
Myanmar regime 
Sensitivity over 
human rights 
violations within 
own borders 
11 July 2008 Zimbabwe: imposition 
of sanctions 
Failure to approve 
sanctions against 
Mugabe regime 
Negative effect on 
Chinese arms 
exporters to 
Zimbabwe 
5 February 2012 Syria: sanctions 
against Assad regime 
Failure to approve 
sanctions against 
violence inflicted 
on anti-Assad 
protestors 
Negative impact of 
Chinese sales of 
weapons to Syrian 
regime. 
 
[Sources: See Wuthnow and Media Outlets BBC, CNN, 
Chicago Tribune, Guardian Newspapers.] 
The changes in China have had a remarkable impact on 
Australia. In the 1970s, it was far from clear what the 
future world would hold for China and what that might 
mean for Australia. At the time, Australia’s economic 
focus was on Japan, which had already been Australia’s 
largest export market for almost a decade. 
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However, after four decades as Australia’s foremost 
trading partner, Japan was overtaken (only in 2009 – 
three short years ago) when China became Australia’s 
largest export market. China now holds the double 
distinction of being not only Australia’s largest 
export market but also of being Australia’s largest 
trade partner.  The value of 
Australian resources exports to China has sky-rocketed. 
China now takes more than 23% of Australian exports. In 
2009-2010, iron ore exports to China were worth $25 
billion and coal exports were worth $5 billion. In 2009-
2010, China supplied nearly 18% of Australian imports.
 The same year, 
Chinese investment in Australia rose to $16.3 billion 
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(75% of which being in the resources sector) – this 
figure being the third highest source of proposed 
foreign investment, after the United States and the 
United Kingdom, though more than that of Japan.
4
 
 
In this period of great change, the question for 
Australia is ‘what policies do we need to maximize our 
national interest now and in the decades ahead?’ 
Hugh White argues that China’s rising power presents 
Australia with a fundamental dilemma. We want stability. 
We want to benefit from growing Chinese economic power; 
and we want to rely on the benefits derived from United 
States’ strategic power. White recommends that 
Australia urge the United States to seek a ‘concert of 
powers’ with China and other great powers so that 
conflict can be avoided.
5
 
                                                          
4
 Scott Dewar, “Australia, China And The United States: Responding To Changing Great Power Dynamics”, 
Australian Centre On China In The World, Australian National University, circa 2011. 
5
 Ibid. 
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Arguing that White’s proposal is too radical and asks 
the US to yield too many of its own strategic options, 
Dewar asserts that Australia should maintain our 
security links with the United States as well as our 
economic engagement with China. Dewar further adumbrates 
the view that Australia should foster and pursue a 
‘shared strategic approach’ towards China with 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and, of 
course, Japan.
6
 
 
 
II. DOMESTIC FACTORS:EXIGENCIES THREATENING CCP CONTROL 
 
China saw 180,000 protests, riots and mass 
demonstrations in 2010 alone – an average of about 500 
every day – a number that has likely since increased. 
Villagers’ complaints are common ones: local officials 
exploiting land sales and violently repressing dissent.
7
 
Gary Locke, US Ambassador to China, has said “...There 
is a growing frustration among the people over the 
operations of government, corruption, lack of 
transparency and issues that affect the Chinese people 
on a daily basis that [the people] feel are being 
neglected.”8 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Max Fisher, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day”, The Atlantic, 5 January 2012. 
8
 See “US Ambassador: China’s Political Stability Very Delicate, Rights Situation Worsened”, Tibetan Review, 20 
January 2012. 
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Given the lack of political freedoms, the Chinese 
government’s legitimacy rests on its ability to deliver 
improved living standards and increased economic 
opportunity to the masses. So far, the masses have 
benefited to a certain degree with 200 million people 
having been lifted out of poverty, though that could 
change quite suddenly.
9
 
There is the growing problem of unemployment and 
underemployment among university graduates. Since 1999, 
when the Chinese government began a drive to increase 
university education, the number of graduates has risen 
seven-fold, but the number of high-skilled, high paying 
jobs has not kept pace.
10
 
According to risk Consultancy Company Maplecroft, China 
is categorized as ‘extreme risk’ across several areas 
including: 
 civil and political rights 
 judicial independence 
 democratic governance 
 labour rights 
 human rights violations by security forces 
Companies which are deemed in any way to be supporting a 
government or its agents in stifling democracy, liberty 
and human rights may suffer damage to their reputations. 
                                                          
9
  Views of Barry Eichenberry, Professor of Economics and Political Science at Berkeley University. 
10
 Professor Eichenberry. 
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Blind Chinese activist, Chen Guangcheng, has accused 
Beijing of failing to uphold its own laws, saying its 
abusive treatment of dissidents – including members of 
his own family – threatens China’s political 
stability. As he remarked in May 2012, “Indeed, 
China’s political stability may depend on its ability 
to develop the rule of law in a system where it barely 
exists.”11 
 
Figure 1 : Extent and Frequency of Strikes Over Pay and Conditions by Chinese Transport 
Workers - February 2011 to April 2012 
 
                                                          
11
 See “China’s ‘Lawlessness’ Threatens Stability: Chen”, The Times of India, 30 May 2012. 
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Figure 2 : Heavy Police 'Crackdowns' on Protests over the State of the Chinese 
Environment 
 
Figure 3 : Bravely Defiant Demonstrator at Shanghai Police Break Up of 'Jasmine 
Revolution' Protest 12 
                                                          
12
 The term has meaning in two political contexts. The Tunisian Revolution which overthrew President Zine El 
Abibine Ben Ali by popular protests was called the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ by media outlets and heralded the 
beginning of the Arab Spring. The 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests were inspired by the Tunisian 
Revolution and called a ‘Jasmine Revolution’ by some of the Chinese organizers. 
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Figure 4 : Collective Accused at Show Trial in Fujian Province in 2000 for Corruption - An 
Endemic and Widespread Crime in China 13 
  
 
Despite the use of violent and ruthless riot control 
force, the Politburo is concerned over a wide range of 
matters that are ‘eating away’ at the 63 year reign of 
the CCP. Below, I list some 24 such matters, extending 
across the four vital spheres of economics, environment, 
health and politics. Each issue is a potential 
catastrophe for the Chinese people and for the Communist 
‘princelings’ who seek to manage the country without 
meaningful reform or sharing of power within a multi-
party system. 
 
                                                          
13
 A secret Report by the People’s Bank of China stated that more than 10,000 corrupt Chinese officials 
embezzled $120 billion over 15 years (approximately between 1996 and 2011), many of whom fled to either 
Australia or the United States with the stolen money. See “Mistakenly-Released Report Reveals Embarrassing 
Extent Of Chinese Corruption”, The Australian, 17 June 2011. 
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DESCRIPTIVE TABLE: CHINA’S DESTABILIZING FACTORS 
Economic Health Environment Political 
 Increasing Inflation  Severe Acute 
Respiratory 
Syndrome 
[SARS] 
 Widespread 
Pollution 
 Leadership 
Worries over 
‘Jasmine 
Revolutions’ 
 Labour Shortages  HIV/AIDS  Eco-system 
destruction 
 Communication 
Networks by 
internal and 
external 
Activists 
 Rising Energy Costs  Tuberculosis  Undrinkability 
by Humans of 40% 
of river water 
 
 
 CCP narrow 
base of 
Support 
 Wealth Inequality (5% of 
people own 50% of Bank 
Assets) 
 Malnutrition 
among rural 
children 
 Desertification 
and Erosion of 
Top Soil 
 Weak Channels 
for State-
Society 
Conflict 
Resolution 
 Unnecessary/Unprofitable 
buildings and factories 
 Chronic Lung 
Cancer, Heart 
Disease and 
Stroke 
through heavy 
smoking 
 Deforestation  Weak Rule of 
Law 
 Bad Investment in high-
speed Railways not 
affordable by most 
Chinese 
 Over-use of 
Anti-Biotics 
producing 
drug 
resistant 
bacteria 
 Evaporation of 
Lakes and Rivers 
 Embezzlement 
by  absconding 
Managers of 
funds gained 
through 
illegal land 
transfers and 
stolen assets 
from shut down 
State 
Enterprises 
[Sources: Media Reports and Official Statements between 2010 and 2012 available in the public domain through 
Internet access.] 
 
Given such a range of destabilizing factors, the 
question arises, how is it that the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) manages to remain in absolute power? 
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To begin with, central party control is tightest in 
central government offices and in urban economic, 
industrial and cultural settings. It is considerably 
looser over government and party organizations in rural  
areas.  
Figure 5 : The Triangular Corporate One Party State Power Structure 
 
The primary organs of power in the Communist Party 
include the General Secretary; the Politburo (22 full 
members); the Politburo Standing Committee (9 members at 
present); and the Central Military Commission. 
The economy, however, the basis of China’s rise to 
date, is now seriously unbalanced with excessive 
dependence on investment in property construction, 
infrastructure and exports. The forces of capital have 
been the largest beneficiaries of growth, not the 
workers. Migrant workers in the cities lack the right to 
education, health care or property purchases.
14
 
                                                          
14
 Jonathan Fenley, “China Is Deeply Flawed. Its Dominance Is Not Inevitable”, The Guardian, 5 April 2012. 
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The most powerful people in China are those that sit on 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which controls 
all aspects of China’s political system. It currently 
is comprised of nine members, though has been as low as 
five. Most of the members control at least one of six 
key systems; these being (1) party affairs; (2) 
organizational affairs (involving all party positions); 
(3) propaganda and education;  
Figure 6 : Party Control Over External Media/Internet Sites 
 (4) political and legal affairs (involving the courts 
and the police and any ‘crackdown’ campaigns against 
dissidents or perceived ‘enemies of the people’;
 
Figure 7 : Special Police Squad For Demonstration Control 
 (5) finance and economics (led principally by the Prime 
Minister); and (6) military affairs (whereby the CCP 
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tries to maintain civilian control of the PLA which 
shares in operational decisions.) 
Given that the armed force of the PLA is the ultimate 
factor maintaining CCP control across all of China, 
there are a number of means used by the party to keep 
the PLA reasonably responsive to party, not just 
military, wishes. The party is being cognizant of Mao’s 
dictum “The party must always control the gun; the gun 
must never control the party.”CCP influence over the 
PLA consists of the Military Affairs Committee; 
budgetary allocations; the placing of political 
commissars in every military unit; and overlapping CCP 
and Politburo membership with the military. 
Another important means of asserting and retaining 
control over China is the deliberate lack of a truly 
independent judiciary. China is dominated by personally 
based power, whereby ‘rule of man’ not ‘rule of law’ 
takes place. Officials perpetuate this situation as it 
enhances their authority. Local interests prevail in 
court decisions; plaintiffs from other external regions 
do not win their cases.
15
 
Overall, then, the CCP controls all aspects of 
government in China. There are no other political 
parties outside the CCP; all government officials must 
be members of the CCP; and all officials of the 
Provincial and Central wings of the party are appointed. 
                                                          
15
 Power Point Lecture, Power In China <teaching.ust.hk/~sosc152/ppt/Lecture 18.ppt> Accessed 4 August 
2012. 
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There is no voting by the people, except in village-
level elections where selected party members stand for 
low hierarchical positions. There is no independent 
judiciary, all judges being chosen by, and being 
accountable to, party members. 
The party makes all local, national and foreign policies 
and very few external checks and balances – such as the 
separation of powers between the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary – exist. CCP members are 
formally groomed, selected and trained from early 
childhood. Confucian traditions are used to rule China 
‘scientifically’ as what David Shaumbaugh, a noted 
Sinologist, calls “a meritocratic technocracy.” Most 
high level party officials come from a science or 
engineering background.
 
Figure 8 : The 'Apostolic Succession' of Party Dictators from Mao to Hu 
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 The average citizen, who may be permitted to join the 
party, cannot expect to rise within it. Susan Shirk, 
another prominent Sinologist, describes the most 
powerful government departments as “the control 
cartel.”16 
Sadly, human rights in China are rigidly curtailed, 
over-ridden and violated. The flow of information to the 
people is controlled by the Propaganda Department. The 
right to gather and associate in groups is heavily 
restricted. All individual citizens are subject to 
arbitrary searches, arrests, torture and imprisonment. 
Citizens have few property rights and extensive land 
seizures are commonplace. Freedom of movement around, in 
and out of the country is strictly controlled by the 
government. Families throughout much of China are still 
limited to having one child only, as part of a 
population control measure. 
17
 
Given that 150,000 to 180,000 protest demonstrations 
occur each year in China against the harshness of the 
regime and the gross inequality of both income and 
wealth, the CCP has adopted a number of procedures to 
prevent future large scale demonstrations and social 
unrest. The party seeks to achieve unity within the 
ruling elite. The government makes it difficult for 
protest to spread from person to person and to the 
public at large (by jailing dissident leaders and 
                                                          
16
  See “Modern China: The Promise And Challenge Of An Emerging Superpower”, World Savvy Monitor, Issue 
2, June 2008, Sub-Section “The Chinese Communist Party”. 
17
 Ibid. 
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harassing/threatening their families). It addresses 
piecemeal some of the corruption issues that are at the 
centre of such protests. It has introduced some (flimsy) 
safety valve mechanisms in the form of direct elections 
of different party members at the local, though not at 
the provincial or the national levels.
  
Figure 9 : The 'Cuddly Side' To A Repressive One Party Dictatorship - A Panda 
It desperately seeks to rebuild its 
damaged‘legitimacy’ through continued economic 
prosperity. When on weak grounds, it uses declared 
external threats as a distraction (harnessing anti-
American, anti-Taiwanese and anti-Japanese sentiments 
held by, and governmentally encouraged in, many Chinese 
citizens.)  
 
Figure 10 : The CCP's Greatest Fear - Desertion Of The Party (50,000 To 70,000 A Day) 
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Finally, it ruthlessly uses force to contain erupting 
protests and to deter others.
18
 
The ultimate sanction any government possesses is the 
taking of human life. Throughout the 20
th
 century, 
civilian murders by dictatorial/authoritarian regimes 
amount to an estimated 153 million men, women and 
children. Such killings have extended from Africa, 
across continental Europe, to Southeast Asia, Northeast 
Asia and to Russia. The deaths, stemming from imposed 
starvation or direct violence, amount to six times the 
2010 population of Scandinavia [25 million]; or, the 
combined 2010 populations of such European states as 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary and Portugal [149 million]. 
DEATHS CAUSED BY REPRESSIVE LEADERS – 20TH CENTURY 
Dictator/ 
Ruler 
Nation 
Afflicted 
 Deaths (Millions) 
Yakubu Gowon Nigeria 1.1 
Mengistu Halie Mariam Ethiopia 1.5 
Kim Il Sung North Korea 1.6  
Pol Pot Cambodia 1.7  
Hideki Tojo Imperial Japan 5.0 
Leopold II (King of 
Belgium) 
Congo 15.0 
Adolph Hitler Nazi Germany 17.0 
Joseph Stalin Soviet Russia 23.0 
Mao Ze Dong People’s Republic of 
China 
78.0 
 
[Source: See Juan Carlos P.E. “Top Ten Most Evil Dictators Of All Time (In Order 
Of Kill Count)”URL <popten.net/2010/05/top-ten-most-evil-dictators-of-all-time-
in-order-of-kill-count> Accessed 4 August 2012.] 
                                                          
18
 Ibid. 
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EPILOGUE 
 “The administration of government lies in getting 
proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the 
ruler’s own character. That character is to be 
cultivated by his treading in the ways of duty. And the 
treading [of] those ways of duty is to be cultivated by 
the cherishing of benevolence.” 
CONFUCIUS [551BC -479BC] 
“THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.” 
 
 
